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 Japan’s economic, political and societal recovery after World War II 
is arguably one of the most impressive recoveries of any nation after a war. 
This thesis refers to the works of scholars on Japanese constitutional studies, 
Japanese security studies, Japanese politics and Japanese education to 
identify the forces that helped generate the rise of Japan’s post war recovery 
national narrative. After Identifying the forces that gave rise to the anti-war 
Pacifist national narrative of Japan’s postwar recovery, this thesis highlights 
the role of Japan’s peace museums and memorials in helping to maintain and 
effectively communicate the nation’s postwar values of democracy and 
pacifism to future generations.  
 This thesis will then discuss the challenge for Japan’s Peace 
memorials and museums in an era where anti-war Pacifism is less relevant 
and may eventually cease to exist. The Japanese people and their Prime 
Ministers are still divided in embracing national memorials and museums of 
war to represent their nation. This makes it difficult for peace and war 
memorials and museums to play a much more significant role in the future 
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 In order for a nation to effectively indoctrinate its citizens with a strong sense of 
national values, it is indispensable that its history is told through a single, uncontested 
national narrative. This claim is most relevant to the rise and decline of Japanese 
Pacifism. Following Japan’s defeat in World War II in 1945, the Japanese government 
adopted a new national narrative called Japanese Pacifism. Using Japanese Pacifism as a 
new national narrative, the Japanese state sought to re-indoctrinate its people to become 
contribute to both nation and international society as promoters of world peace. Among 
the many Pacifist re-indoctrination tools used, has been Japan’s Peace Museums, which 
teach and symbolize the history of a new Japanese, Pacifist nation. 
 Japanese Pacifism strongly appealed to its people because it gave them hope 
towards embracing a promising future after having suffered an embarrassing military and 
the horror of the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The most important 
museum to instill Japanese Pacifism in the hearts and minds of the Japanese people has 
been the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum and its Peace Park. The Hiroshima Peace 
Museum has instilled Japanese Pacifist values in the Japanese people through the 
memorials of the Peace Park, the annual peace ceremony, and the museum’s exhibits.
 The Hiroshima Peace Museum as well as other Peace Museums throughout Japan 
gave rise to a strong, uncontested and unifying national narrative of anti-war Pacifism. 
However, since the 1990s, the Hiroshima as well as many others of Japan’s most 
important peace museums has struggled to grow their narrative in the face of rising 
nationalism. For this reason, there has been a turn in both civic and political attention 
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towards incorporating Japan’s war shrines and museums into an emerging nationalist, 
national narrative. The memorial that has become the center of the nation’s political focus 
as a result of a declining Japanese Pacifist narrative has been the Shinto war shrine, 
known as Yasukuni Shrine. If Yasukuni shrine were to become a permanent 
indoctrination tool for Japan’s evolving nationalism, it could greatly undermine the 
relevance of Hiroshima’s anti-war Pacifism to the future of Japan’s national narrative.  
 The increasing number of attempts to politicize Yasukuni shrine demonstrates the 
diminishing appeal of anti-war Japanese Pacifism to Japan’s national narrative. Japanese 
Pacifism is weakening as a unifying national narrative because Japanese Pacifism shies 
away from teaching Japan’s wartime past from the late 19th till the middle of the 20th 
century. Japanese Pacifism although once a unifying, dominant national narrative, is still 
a relevant part of Japan’s national narrative, but not growing like Japanese nationalism. It 
is hard to determine how Japanese Pacifism could continue as the dominant national 
narrative of Japan since it has not developed beyond a post-war recovery narrative.  Plus, 
Japanese leaders have done little to support the reemergence of the Japanese Pacifist 
narrative in Japan’s memorials and museums.  
 The rise and decline of Japanese Pacifism is an important nation case study for 
how nations can successfully develop and maintain their national narratives. During the 
rise of Japanese Pacifism, the Japanese people effectively embodied the nation’s new 
values of democracy and Pacifism in Japan’s memorials and museums. Though ever 
since Japanese Pacifism has begun to decline, the Japanese people have struggled to 
revise the narratives in the existing peace memorials or museums or find a group of 
nationalist memorials and museums that could develop and maintain Japan’s future 
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national narrative. At the end of this thesis, Germany will also be mentioned as an 
example for how a nation can recreate its national symbols to promote the development 
of a new national narrative. This example is the Dresden museum of military history in 
Dresden, Germany.  
 The goal of this paper is to demystify the challenges faced by Japanese Pacifism 
rooted in an unresolved internal conflict of Japan’s two opposing national narratives 
symbolized by its war and peace museums. In recent years, Japanese Pacifism has 
struggled to engage and indoctrinate its people with its core values originating from its 
conception. This does not suggest that the Japanese Pacifism will die out but that a new 
Japanese neo-nationalist narrative is emerging. This neo-nationalist narrative will 
successfully indoctrinate its people because it will create a single narrative that will be 
conveyed by both Japan’s peace and war symbols. Germany provides a good example for 
Japan in how it can preserve a single national narrative in its museums; however, Japan is 
too passive about revising its Pacifist narrative to once again become a dominant, 










 In various fields of academia, scholars have made significant contributions to 
understanding the national narrative building since the end of World War II, and marked 
by the beginning of Japan’s post World War II recovery. The fields of academia, which 
have been most influential in shaping the direction of this thesis, are Japanese 
constitutional studies, Japanese politics, Japanese security studies, and Japanese 
education. These fields serve as the foundation for the national narrative building that it 
as the core of this thesis and that is the study of Japan’s national memorial and museums.  
 Japanese Constitutional studies is particularly important to this thesis, since the 
new Japanese constitution created the values Japan adopted and developed into its 
postwar national narrative. Robert Ward’s writings support the fundamental the argument 
of this thesis, especially his claims that the Japan’s post-war recovery national narrative 
occurred as the result of U.S.’s role in implementing a new constitution with drastically 
new values for the Japanese nation. He stresses that Japan’s current Constitution or rather 
“The American-authored constitution of 1947” would not have been possible without U.S. 
insistence since the constitution “was in spirit and provisions almost a complete inversion 
of its predecessor, The Meiji Constitution of 1889” (Ward 1965: 401). Ward’s research 
shows that Japan’s new constitution played a major role in planting the seeds for the 
development of a new national narrative, since many Japanese people attribute the role of 
the new constitution to the nation’s postwar recovery (Ward 1965:402). 	   Japanese Constitutional studies arguably have been preceded by Japanese security 
studies, since changes in Japan’s national security called for the adoption of new national 
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values. Changes to Japan’s national security not only led to the adoption of its current 
constitution but also helped generate Japan’s national narrative of antimilitarism. Thomas 
Berger points out that the development of Japan’s national narrative of postwar 
reconstruction and antimilitarism depended on Japan’s defense treaty with the U.S. 
Burger claims that, “Japan’s culture of anti-militarism originally developed under the 
aegis of a benevolent U.S. hegemon during the 1950s and 1960s. Since then it has taken 
root and is no longer a hothouse plant that would wither and die the moment American 
commitment to East Asia security affairs weakens” (Berger 1993:120). If Japan were not 
under the protection of the U.S., it would have no choice but to develop strong offensive 
military capabilities, thus having little incentive to continue developing an anti-war 
national narrative. 	   The	   development	   of	   an	   anti-­‐war	   and	   eventual	   Pacifist	   national	   narrative	  although	  sustained	  by	  Japan’s	  political	  system,	  was	  not	  entirely	  embraced	  by	  Japan’s	  politicians.	  As	  Robert Ward demonstrates in his writings on the development of postwar 
Japanese politics, the reality that Japanese politicians have been trying to undo the anti-
militarism and democratic constitutional values since, “When the Liberal Democratic 
Party was formed in 1955, its basic platform called for ‘voluntary revision of the 
constitution to insure Japan’s full-fledged independence” (Ward 1965: 405). If not for 
Japan’s transformation into a democracy, Japan would have struggled to grow its antiwar 
national narrative and indoctrinate its people in values that were not originally Japanese. 
 The continuation of Japan’s national narrative of anti-militarism and democracy 
therefore rested upon the role of Japanese education in indoctrinating its people in new 
national values. Norio Ikeno claims that, “Within this determination to establish a 
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democratic focus, modern Japanese education has been centrally planned. The Ministry 
of Education decides the Courses of Study, provides the basic framework for curricula, 
and approves the textbooks. But each school implements education according to 
individual interpretations of the Courses of Study and textbooks, so education in each 
school has both uniform and diverse characteristics” (Ikeno 2005: 93). Ikeno refers to the 
Japanese Ministry of Education’s creation of a national social studies curriculum to teach 
students “the attitude and skills to participate positively in their society in order to build a 
democratic society” (Ministry of Education, 1948:13).  
 School Education helped create a strong bond between the Japanese people and 
the Constitution’s new democratic and antiwar values. The importance of Japanese 
national education coincided with the creation of national memorials and museums to 
symbolize Japan’s postwar national narrative. Lisa Yoneyama stresses the impact that 
Japanese new national memorials and museums made to symbolize and preserve Japan’s 
postwar reconstruction narrative. Yoneyama’s focus is on the rebuilding of the city of 
Hiroshima, which helped to develop Japan’s postwar narrative into Japanese Pacifism. 
Hiroshima rebuilt itself as a city of world peace and culture, which led to the 
development of Japanese Pacifism as the basis of Hiroshima’s war memories  (Yoneyama 
1999: 18). Japanese Pacifism symbolized by Hiroshima’s postwar recovery became 
Japan’s Mecca of the Japanese Pacifist national narrative, when political figures from the 
central government began to take part in the city’s international peace ceremony 
(Yoneyama 1999:14). 
 While Hiroshima’s national peace memorials and museum helped preserve 
Japan’s postwar narrative, these national symbols have been reluctant to address changes 
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that have affected Japan’s national narrative from the 1980s until 2015. Mike Mochizuki 
and Samuel Porter point out the political platform of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who is 
trying to reverse the Constitution’s prohibitions on Japan’s armed forces, (Mochizuki & 
Porter 2013: 33). While Robert Ward highlighted the early attempts by the Liberal 
Democratic Party to revise Japan’s constitution in the 1950s, there is much more 
likelihood of constitutional revision in the near future (Ward 1965: 405). Given the trend 
of a possible constitutional revision occurring, the anti-war narrative symbolized in 
Hiroshima Peace memorials and museums could grow increasingly less valuable to the 
development of Japan’s national narrative.  
 The call for Constitutional Revisionism in the second decade of the 2000s, has 
been influenced largely by the rise of China, and the military threats it poses to Japan and 
the U.S. Paul Midford, shows that the U.S. and Japan’s strategic defense partnership 
encourages Japan to play a more active role in international security, which would upset 
Japan’s neighbors, particularly China, (Midford, 2011: 15). The rise of a strong China 
since the 1980s, and the possibility of military confrontation between Japan and China 
over disputed territories have not only influenced political efforts to foster changes to the 
existing Constitution, (Cooney & Sato, 2008: 46). The rise of China poses a growing 
national security threat to Japan, causing a shift away from Japan’s antiwar, Pacifist 
national narrative. 	   The growing security threats to Japan’s national security as a result has fueled 
historical revisionist education, to create a nationalist education. Japan’s national 
narrative, argues Yangmo Ku is moving away from an anti-war, Japanese Pacifist 
narrative into one in which Japanese history textbooks remove and gloss over teaching 
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imperial Japan’s war crimes against the peoples of its colonies during World War II. 
China and Korea who not only have territorial disputes with Japan, but have bitter 
memories of Japanese colonialism embedded in their national narratives are outraged at 
the content of ignoring of Japanese war crimes against the Koreans and Chinese in 
Japanese history textbooks, (Ku 2014: 261). Part of the reason the rise of historical 
revisionist education is such a concerning matter is because the Japanese Pacifist 
narrative stemming from Hiroshima does not Pacifist narrative does not cover the horrors 
of Japan’s colonial past and abuses, especially from World War II (Yoneyama 1995: 3).  	   The move toward historical revisionism, seeking to redefine the nation’s values 
has had a tremendous impact on Japan’s memorials and museums. Daiki Shibuichi points 
out that this has led Japanese politicians to try to incorporate war memorials into 
becoming a part of Japan’s national narrative. The most controversial of these war 
memorials is the Yasukuni war shrine memorial, which has become a symbolic 
destination for Japanese prime ministers seeking to revive Japanese nationalism. 
Shibuichi argues that these political visits not only undermine the Pacifist order at home 
but cause international backlash from rising China and South Korea, (Shibuichi 2005: 
206). If Yasukuni shrine became a symbol of Japan’s national narrative, its war museum 
the Yushukan, could strain the relationship between Japanese Pacifism and Japan’s 
national narrative. Rumi Sakamoto demonstrates the challenges that the Yushukan’s self-
justifying victimization narrative of Japan’s wartime past, poses to the preservation of a 
Pacifist national narrative, (Sakamoto, 2015: 161).   
 While I was able to find a lot of scholarly works in various fields that discussed 
Japanese Pacifism or rising Japanese nationalism, I came across only one scholarly work 
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titled The Rise and Decline of Japanese Pacifism written by Yuan Cai. Cai argues that the 
decline of Japanese Pacifism is the result of a “generational change in Japan,” which 
“slowly eroded the foundation of Pacifism built on victimhood.” On top of that she 
claims that the “Post-war economic prosperity largely rendered the tales of hardship and 
sufferings incomprehensible to a youth who had only known affluence” (Cai, 2007: 197).  
Cai claims that the survival of Japanese Pacifism is “based on the notion of victim 
conscience” (Cai, 2007: 181). While I refer to Cai’s affirmation at the end of this thesis to 
show that Japanese Pacifism is on the decline, I put less of a focus on the concept of 
victimization as it relates to Japanese Pacifism. 
  The developments in Japanese constitutional studies, Japan’s national security, 
Japanese politics, and education all serve as the basic ingredients for the focus of this 
thesis, the role of Japan’s memorials and museums in the rise and decline of Japanese 
Pacifism. Given the length of this thesis, it is too difficult to conduct a full analysis of the 
rise and decline of Japanese Pacifism through these various fields of academia. Since this 
thesis will focus how Japan’s memorials and museums have advanced the direction of 
Japan’s national narrative after World War II, I hope to inspire others to write more on 
role of memorials and museums in contributing to the rise and decline of Japanese 
Pacifism.  
 The goal of this thesis is not only to turn the rise and decline of Japanese Pacifism 
into a more widely discussed topic but also carefully address the importance of Japan’s 
memorials and museums in maintaining its existing and futures national narratives. In the 
final chapter of this thesis, I highlight the current direction of Japan’s national narrative 
stuck between Pacifism and nationalism. This last chapter draws on historical examples 
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of Japan’s past from the Meiji period and post World War II Germany to discuss the 
impact and also the limitations of Japan’s peace and war memorials and museums on 

























 The rebuilding of Japan after World War II is a story of successful nation building 
and one of the world’s remarkable social and political recoveries, amongst any defeated 
nation in any war. The beginning of Japan’s postwar narrative dates from the defeat of 
the Japanese Imperial Army against the Allied Powers, marking the end of World War II 
(September 2, 1945). The end of World War II marked a new era for Japan, which for the 
first time in its history was both defeated and occupied by a foreign power. Japanese 
history is well known for its many thousands of years of war, Japan reemerged as 
completely different nation. A nation constitutionally prohibited from engaging in and 
declaring war. This switch from an aggressive colonial power to an antiwar nation did not 
occur at the will of the Japanese people. This new step for the Japanese nation was the 
direct result of changes to Japan’s Constitution, political system and national security. 
 Japanese antimilitarism emerged after the end of World War II in largely due to 
changes in Japan’s national security from a strong independent military to one completely 
reliant on the U.S. Following the defeat of the Japanese Empire in 1945, the U.S. carried 
out a full military occupation of Japan until 1952 (Office of the Historian, Milestones 
1945-1952). U.S. General Douglas MacArthur became the Supreme Commander of the 
Allied Powers (SCAP), which became the transitional overseer of the rebuilding of the 
Japanese state for seven years. MacArthur worked with the new Japanese government to 
make significant changes to Japan’s international security that would put Japan under the 
U.S.’s protective wing. The two changes to Japan’s national defense came from the 
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writing/adoption of a new postwar Pacifist Constitution and the U.S.-Japan Security 
Treaty.  
 After World War II, Japan was politically transformed into a democratic nation, 
and forcefully distanced from its wartime past. The biggest effect on pacifying the 
Japanese nation came from the Japanese government’s acceptance of U.S. General 
MacArthur’s authored Japanese Constitution. The Japanese government fought hard to 
negotiate a constitution that would be favorable to the Japanese, that would allow the 
emperor to remain as head of state and allow Japan to maintain its military (Berkofsky, 
2012: 74). However, General McArthur forced the Japanese government in 1946 to 
accept its U.S. authored constitution that abolished the emperor’s political authority and 
the Japanese government’s ability to declare war. The Japanese Prime Minister in 1946, 
Kijuro Shidehara, accepted the U.S. authored Constitution and sought to indoctrinate the 
Japanese people in new values of pacifism and democracy. This is demonstrated by a 
passage, in which Berkofsky quoted from Shidehara’s autobiography, Gaiko Jyunen 
(1951) that says, “If our people are to occupy a place of honor in the family of nations, 
we must see to it that our constitution internally establishes the foundation for a 
democratic government and externally leads the rest of the world for the abolition of war” 
(Berkofsky, 2008: 79). 
 The rise of Japanese Pacifism begins with the enactment of the Japanese 
Constitution on May 3rd 1947. The Constitution transferred national power from the 
emperor and his military government to the new Japanese parliament and most of all 
Japanese people themselves. The two most important articles to understanding the role of 
the emperor to the development of Japan’s postwar national narrative are Chapter I, 
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Articles 4 and Article 7 of the Japanese Constitution. Article 4 declares that the “The 
Emperor shall perform only such acts in matters of state as are provided for in this 
Constitution and he shall not have powers related to government” (japan.kantei.go.jp, 
1946). This forced Japan to sever its connection to its pre-war narrative and Meiji 
Constitution enacted in 1889, which in the Chapter I, Article I says that, “The Empire of 
Japan shall be reigned over and governed by a line of Emperors unbroken for ages eternal” 
(Ito, https://history.hanover.edu/texts/1889con.html, 1889). The emperor would although 
no longer exercise political authority, he remains important to Japan as a national symbol 
since he exercises authority to conduct the “Performance of ceremonial functions” 
(Article 8, 1946). 
 Since Japan was able to maintain the emperor as a national symbol, the Japanese 
people did not have to abandon all of their history. However, the Japanese did not have 
any experience dealing with American political values of democracy or let alone Pacifism.  
Therefore, the solid glue of the Japanese Pacifist Constitution dealt with Japan’s defense 
outlined in Chapter II, Article 9. Article 9, as it is often referred to, outlaws Japan’s 
ability to go to war saying “Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice 
and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation 
and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes” 
(japan.kantei.go.jp, 1946). This article intensified the effect of Japan being under the 
U.S.’s security umbrella, rendering Japan’s defenses dependent on the U.S. Although 
America and Japan together outlawed Japan’s right to go to war and deploy offensive 
military capabilities, this was not a pure Japanese Pacifist indoctrination. A Japanese 
Police Force was created after the adoption of the Constitution in 1947, and then The 
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Japanese Self Defense Force (SDF) was established in (1953), which could acquire 
defense capabilities solely for the purpose to protect Japan from invasion (Ota, 2000-
2001:57).  
 Japanese Pacifism was a clear departure from Japan’s brutal colonial past and an 
entry point to U.S. inspired democracy. The most important historical event after the end 
of World War II in Japan’s postwar history that split Japanese Pacifism from including its 
wartime abuses in its Pacifist Narrative was the Tokyo War Trials (1946-1948). The 
verdicts made in this trial have left a mark on Japanese Pacifism and stain the course of 
Japan’s national narrative even up to today. This historical event should be examined not 
just from a legal perspective but also for the purpose of this thesis as a departure from the 
past and the view of the road forward.  
 Japanese Pacifism would have been short-lived had it not been for the U.S.’s role 
in Americanizing Japan’s political institutions. During World War II, the opposition 
parties to the State Shinto government were incredibly weak and mainly Socialist and 
Communist Parties. Since the Soviet Union led Communists and all Communist regimes 
were the U.S.’s sworn enemies, there remained every incentive for SCAP to ensure that 
significant power stayed out of the hands of Japan’s communists (U.S. Department of 
State: Office of the Historian, history.state.gov). For this reason, those that exercised and 
have continued to exercise significant power and influence in the Japanese government, 
even up until today, are connected to the political platform of those Japanese that 
governed Japan during World War II.  
 Japan’s new national narrative of pacifism and democracy lasted because it 
appealed to the Japanese people and helped them find meaning in rebuilding their nation.  
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Despite the end of the U.S. occupation of Japan in 1952, and the emergence of Japan’s 
newest and most influential political party emerged, the Liberal Democratic Party, which 
wanted to revise Japan’s Constitution, Japanese Pacifism continued. Japan no longer 
reported to the U.S. on political issues like it did to SCAP, making the authorization of 
constitutional provisions no longer in the hands of the SCAP. According to Robert E. 
Ward, who has written extensively on Japanese Political Parties after the end of WWII, 
the Liberal Democratic Party or LDP’s “basic platform called for “voluntary revision of 
the constitution to insure Japan’s full-fledged independence” (Ward, 1965: 405). Here 
begins the start of the tightrope walk for Japanese Pacifism. From the beginning of call 
within the LDP for constitutional revision, Japanese Pacifism kept its balance because 
principles of U.S. democracy and the development of the Japanese Pacifist narrative 
continued to resonate with the Japanese people. 
 Even after the LDP tried to make an immediate return of Pacifist Japan back to a 
militaristic nation, Japanese Pacifism proved it could bear any political threat. Some of 
the proponents of Constitutional revisionism within the LDP sought to reverse the Japan-
U.S. Security Treaty, Article 9, which outlaws war, and create a self-reliant Japan on the 
issue of national defense. These efforts were nearly an impossible task because since 
Japan was now a democratic country, it could not forcibly remove political opposition or 
rewrite the Constitution at its own accord. These LDP members grew up and received all 
of their political, social and national indoctrination under a State Shinto nation predating 
Pacifist Japan (1945). Therefore, these members who had previously served the 
government of the Empire of Japan faced a great societal disconnect between the citizens 
of a new democratic Japan.  
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 An essential ingredient to creating the stability of a Pacifist national narrative that 
allowed Japan to resist the efforts of revisionist LDP politicians were Japan’s democratic 
educational institutions. Adding to the democratic political and electoral reforms that 
occurred in Japan, the LDP’s platform was further weakened by a weak hold on the 
Japanese education system. Many of the politicians in the LDP that favored 
Constitutional Revisionism served in the government of the Empire of Japan and 
maintained tight control over the education system. The LDP, though, did not have the 
luxury of being able to operate and forcefully establish Constitutional Revisionism in the 
Japanese school system. A massive education reform campaign was carried out by SCAP 
that prohibited all history teachers who taught during World War II from teaching in 
schools from 1945 on (MEXT). 
 The educational campaign by the Japanese Ministry of Education in Japanese 
schools helped to create a new sense of citizenry for Japanese as members of a 
democratic and Pacifist society. New curriculum and textbook laws were adopted, which 
helped to indoctrinate future generations of Japanese in democratic and gradually 
Japanese Pacifist values. The most significant education reform to re-indoctrinate the 
Japanese people in U.S. inspired democratic values and later Japanese Pacifism was the 
Basic Act on Education adopted in 1947. According to the Japanese Ministry of 
Education, the Basic Act on Education was inspired by the “spirit of the Constitution” 
and established the principles of “equal opportunity, compulsory education, co-education, 
school education, social education, prohibition of partisan political education, prohibition 
of religious education for a specific religion in the national and local public schools and 
prohibition of improper control of education,” (MEXT). The three most powerful 
Soll	  21	  
principles put forth by this law that cripple the chances that the LDP were able to 
indoctrinate its people in constitutional revisionism are the prohibitions of “partisan 
political education,”  “religious education for a specific religion in the national and local 
public schools” and of “improper control of education,” (MEXT). 
 The way in which the Basic Act on Education recreated the textbook selection 
process, allowed for the democratization of the Japanese education system because it 
removed direct political figures’ authority over creating a national narrative. In the past, 
the Japanese government had full control over deciding, publishing and providing its own 
books to schools, “Until the end of World War II, the government generally authored 
textbooks” (Mofa.go.jp). The Basic Act of Education overturned this control by 
prohibiting the state from providing its own ideologically inspired textbooks to schools. 
The Japanese Ministry of Education, which is not under the authority of the military, has 
a committee, which grants permission to permits the choice from a list of subject 
textbooks. Local schools received the right to choose from a list of approved textbooks 
written by private individuals and educational societies. These reforms were instrumental 
in paving the way for Japanese democratic ideals and the further rise of Japanese 
Pacifism. However, issues surrounding Japan’s textbook laws in more recent years have 
become a powerful force against Japanese Pacifism. 
 Had it not been for the educational reforms democratizing Japan’s education 
system, the LDP could have easily ended the life of the Japanese Pacifist narrative. This 
is because of a growing popularity of constitutional revisionism within the LDP but 
meanwhile the failure of revisionism to capture the hearts and minds of the Japanese 
people, who now were educated in democratic and antiwar values. In the 1950s, the LDP 
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established a Constitutional Revision Committee after the outbreak of the Korean War 
(1950-1953). The efforts of the committee lasted through the 1960s, at which Robert 
Ward claims that “For the first time since the war, the democratic process seemed really 
to be in danger” (Ward: 1965, 432). The revision committee failed because of the 
powerful educational, political, legal mechanisms already at work to indoctrinate the 
Japanese people in democratic and emerging Pacifist values. Also, the presence of U.S. 
troops increased in Japan during the Korean War, which added to a growing image 
among the Japanese public that America would provide steadfast defense for Japan, 
making any revision practically impossible.  
 The education system had a major impact on reorienting the Japanese people 
towards a new national narrative. Another major breakthrough that significantly 
strengthened the development of Japanese Pacifism was the symbolization of the 
Japanese Pacifist narrative in the rebuilding of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The leaders of 
these two cities created Japan’s Pacifist pilgrimage spots by launching reconstruction 
campaigns to recreate these cities as Japanese lead centers of world peace. Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki became the Mecca and Medina of the Japanese Pacifist movement by utilizing 
a narrative as the world’s first and only nuclear-bombed cities. The rebuilding of 
Hiroshima was championed by mayor Shinzo Hamai, who sought to persuade the central 
government and other foreign nations like the U.S. to assist with the rebuilding of 
Hiroshima, to which Ran Zwingenberg refers to Shinzo Hamai’s pledge to “help the 
rebuilding of Hiroshima as Peace City” (Zwingenberg, 2014: 36). Hamai’s vision for 
Hiroshima as a metropolitan symbol for world peace succeeded in large part due to the 
creation of new national symbols of peace and of Hiroshima’s post-war reconstruction. 
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 Hiroshima’s recovery became a unifying symbol for the Japanese Pacifist national 
narrative because it served as a reminder of the horrors of war and also showed the fruits 
of prosperity by fulfilling a mission to spread world peace. Hiroshima’s Reconstruction 
became symbolized as a “forward-looking memorial recounting to visitors a story of 
resurrection and promise,” given the boulevard full of trees, improved roads at the city’s 
center (Zwigenberg, 2014: 52). The city of Hiroshima developed into a modern city but 
preserved the remains of atomic bombed buildings at the Peace Park to maintain a sense 
of despair for the victims lost in the bomb blast. At the center of Hiroshima’s downtown, 
became the site of Hiroshima’s Peace Park and Peace Memorial Museum, which 
represented the reconstructed image of Hiroshima.  
 The city of Hiroshima made Japanese Pacifism into more than simply a 
movement but rather a Japanese national tradition that presented a universal message, a 
prayer for peace. The tradition of celebrating and memorializing Japanese Pacifism called 
the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Ceremony began on August 6th 1947, two years after the 
atomic bombing of Hiroshima (visithiroshima.net). The location of the ceremony was 
eventually moved to the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park in the center of Hiroshima. This 
ceremony calls to remember the victims of the atomic bombs, those who have suffered 
from the bomb’s radiation, followed by a prayer for peace calling for an end to war and 
the abolishment of nuclear weapons (visithiroshima.net). This ceremony helped instill a 
new narrative of memory and hope for the city of Hiroshima. 
  The Hiroshima Peace Memorial Ceremony was foremost a way to celebrate and 
remember Hiroshima’s contribution to the progress of Japanese Pacifism. The Peace 
Ceremony, while originally Hiroshima’s own way of embracing Pacifism and 
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contributing to the future of the Pacifist movement, eventually became an important 
symbol for the entire Japanese nation. Lisa Yoneyama mentions that Japanese Prime 
Minister, Eisaku Sato’s “participation marked the beginnings of the official and statist 
nationalization of Hiroshima’s memory” and a tradition for future Japanese Prime 
Ministers to participate in the ceremony (Yoneyama, 1999: 14). The Japanese Prime 
Ministers also begun to participate in the peace ceremony in Nagasaki linked the Pacifist 
national narrative to the memorials and museums of these cities.  
  Hiroshima’s Pacifist narrative has continued to grow because its universal 
narrative of peace not only captures the hearts of its own citizens but also of people from 
around the world. A great example of the international appeal of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki’s narratives of peace includes the fact that consistent group of foreign 
emissaries participate in the Hiroshima Peace ceremony and make annual visits to 
Hiroshima. Hiroshima’s mayor Takeshi Araki established an organization called Mayors 
for Peace, on June 24th 1982 “to Promote the Solidarity of Cities toward the Total 
Abolition of Nuclear Weapons.” The Mayors for Peace organization has been a 
tremendous help to create an internationally appealing Hiroshima narrative, since  “As of 
April 1, 2015, membership stood at 6,649 cities in 160 countries and 
regions,”(mayorsforpeace.org). Every year in both Hiroshima and Nagasaki, a group of 
mayors involved in this organization around the world attend the Peace ceremonies in 
Hiroshima or Nagasaki and participate in collaborative peace workshops. 
 Hiroshima has been able to contribute to the Japanese Pacifist national narrative 
because of the symbolic relevance of its Peace Park to Japan after World War II. The 
Peace Park created an environment to memorialize those affected by the war and the 
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atomic bomb and call for the end of nuclear weapons (Haverson, 2010: 69). Visitors are 
reminded of the everlasting call to abolish nuclear weapons; by the flame of peace, which 
“has burned continuously since it was lit on August 1, 1964. It symbolizes the anti-
nuclear resolve to burn the flame "until the day when all such weapons shall have 
disappeared from the earth" (http://www.pcf.city.hiroshima.jp). Another powerful symbol 
in the Hiroshima Peace Park, which serves as a reminder of the devastation effect of 
nuclear weapons is the atomic bomb dome. The atomic bomb dome or A-bomb dome, 
acts “As a historical witness that conveys the disaster of the first atomic bombing in 
history, and as a symbol of the vow to pursue the abolition of nuclear weapons and 
enduring peace,” (www.pcf.city.hiroshima.jp). The atomic bomb dome therefore is a 
reminder of the past but its surroundings of a green park suggest a bright future that 
Hiroshima enjoyed after the war. The atomic bomb dome is also a spot for Japanese 
Pacifist activists and volunteers alike to gather to share with visitors the history of the 
atomic bomb dome and communicate the horrors of nuclear weapons in today’s society.  
 The Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park preserves the memories of the atomic bomb 
and shows the rebuilding of a prosperous Japan as a symbol for world peace. In order to 
preserve the memory of Hiroshima and connect people to Japanese Pacifism, the 
Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum was built. The Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum 
acts as the storyteller that teaches Japanese and international visitors the main tenants of 
Japanese Pacifism and the importance of world peace. While Japanese Pacifism emerged 
from political and security changes during post-WWII Japan, the Hiroshima Peace 
Museum established the basic tenants for educating the Japanese people about Japanese 
Pacifism. Since this museum is a Hiroshima museum, its narrative defines Japanese 
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Pacifism as it relates to Hiroshima’s atomic bomb history. Some of the main themes of 
the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum, include the dropping of the atomic bomb and its 
radiation effects on the local population, calls for the abolishment of anti-nuclear 
weapons decrees, and testimonies of the atomic bomb survivors  
(http://www.pcf.city.hiroshima.jp/virtual/img/pamphlet/english.pdf). 
 The narrative of the Hiroshima Peace museum connects with various audiences 
and peoples from around the world in that it stays true to the representation of Hiroshima 
narrative as well as the nation’s Constitutional provision to promote world peace. The 
first sentence of the Japanese Constitution states that “We, the Japanese people, acting 
through our duly elected representatives in the National Diet, determined that we shall 
secure for ourselves and our posterity the fruits of peaceful cooperation with all nations 
and the blessings of liberty throughout this land, and resolved that never again shall we 
be visited with the horrors of war through the action of government, do proclaim that 
sovereign power resides with the people and do firmly establish this Constitution.” 
(japan.kantei.go.jp). In order to make visitors feel sympathetic towards the victims of 
Hiroshima, the museum’s exhibits present the dropping of the bomb as an emotional and 
also inexplicable event. In line with Japan’s Constitutional values of promoting “peaceful 
cooperation with all nations,” no antagonism, or let alone any blame, is shown towards 
the Imperial Japan for leading Japan into war or the U.S. for dropping the bomb 
(japan.kantei.go.jp).  
  As a visitor, it is amazing how well this museum takes even the most sensitive 
and bitter memories and creates a unifying narrative of Pacifism and the horrors of war. 
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Most shocking is the video exhibit showing the dropping of the atomic bomb by an 
American fighter jet. While the first footage of the video shows an American fighter jet, 
most of the video focuses on the atomic bomb. After the American bomber Enola Gay 
drops the atomic bomb on Hiroshima, the video features no additional commentary 
blaming the U.S. for dropping the bomb on Hiroshima, 
(http://www.pcf.city.hiroshima.jp/virtual/VirtualMuseum_e/frame/tour_fra1-6.html). 
This video features somber music that focuses on the plane flying in a peaceful sky and 
suddenly in a flash; the city of Hiroshima is completely leveled. Since the plane bears the 
mark of a U.S. fighter plane, one would think that even a small sense of hatred would be 
expressed at the U.S. for bombing Japan. But the video depicts the fighter jet almost as if 
it is an anonymous fighter jet or that a bomb fell from the sky and then Japan was 
doomed. There are those who see this component of the museum as propaganda to make 
visitors feel sorry for the “ordinary Japanese” as “passive victims” of the war and the 
atomic bomb (Yoneyama, 1999: 11). However, the fact that this museum can 
communicate a universal narrative that appeals to peoples of all nationalities is absolutely 
remarkable. 
 The Hiroshima museum not only created a universally identifiable narrative but 
also helped empower the Japanese people to contribute to Japanese Pacifism. Several 
sections of the Hiroshima Peace museum are dedicated to the stories of the bomb’s 




The museum has Hibakusha act as educators and guides at the museum to serve as living 
testaments to the horrors of war and leave a powerful message of Japanese Pacifism. 
While the first section of the museum focuses on the destruction that the atomic bomb 
brought about to the Hiroshima landscape, the exhibits on the Hibakusha rely heavily on 
imagery to create an evocative picture of the atomic bomb’s destruction on people  
(http://www.pcf.city.hiroshima.jp/virtual/VirtualMuseum_e/frame/tour_fra1-6.html). 
The museum uses images to convince its visitors to see the atomic bomb survivors as 
survivors of an unprecedented disaster. Since the museum does not focus on historical 
reasons for the dropping of the bomb, the photos of bomb survivors are depicted as 
suffering victims.  
 The Hiroshima Peace Memorial museum seeks to evoke a deep sympathy from 
visitors to the unthinkable hardships suffered by the Hibakusha, which makes them the 
ultimate forbearers of Japanese Pacifism. Philip A. Seaton mentions this scene in his 
book, Japan's Contested War Memories: The 'memory Rifts' in Historical Consciousness 
of World War II. This emphasis appears in a video exhibit featuring an interview of 
Harold Agnew, who participated in the Hiroshima atomic bomb mission and meets with 
two Hibakusha. They meet at the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park, where the two 
Hibakusha describe to Agnew the suffering that the bomb brought to the city and its 
inhabitants and asked him to apologize for dropping the bomb. Agnew responds to the 
Hibakusha saying “no way. Pearl Harbor did it for me. I lost too many friends in Pearl 
Harbor. No apology” (Seaton, 2007: 113 ). This movie is so important to the exhibit that 
comes closest to putting the blame on the Americans for dropping the bomb. Yet this 
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video does not seek to foster Anti-American sentiment, but rather have the viewer pity 
the atomic bomb victims. 
 The exhibits of this museum embody a universal message of peace because they 
indiscriminately make the viewer; regardless of nationality feel a sense of pity for the 
victims. In addition the museum seeks to show its viewers the necessity for Japanese 
Pacifism and the progress it has made worldwide, through its exhibit on the abolishment 
of anti-nuclear weapons. One of the Hiroshima exhibits shows the role of Hiroshima anti-
nuclear weapons activist groups influencing worldwide decisions on nuclear arms 
reductions. One display shows the success of Hiroshima anti-nuclear weapons groups 
having the U.N. putting pressure on nuclear-armed countries to reduce their nuclear arms 
supplies (http://www.pcf.city.hiroshima.jp/virtual/VirtualMuseum_e/frame/tour_fra1-
6.html). Another display seeks an emotional response from the viewer by showing the 
worsening of dangerous nuclear weapons since Hiroshima. A simulator compares the 
distance of the Hiroshima atomic bomb blast to ones that have been developed over the 
years. These more recent nuclear weapons such as Hydrogen bombs and other warheads 
could destroy many Hiroshimas, hence the birth of the saying “No more Hiroshimas” 
(Haverson, 2010: 73). In order to position Hiroshima’s narrative of rebirth and mourning 
for the bomb’s victims to Hiroshima, the rest of Japan and foreign countries, the exhibit 
seeks to emphasize the devastation that nuclear weapons could bring for the world to 
come.  
 Therefore, Japan as a Pacifist nation can have a tremendous impact on the world’s 
nuclear-armed nations to persuade them to reduce their supply of nuclear weapons by 
serving as the world’s only example of the human destruction that nuclear weapons can 
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bring. The nuclear weapons exhibit, features a display of the world’s most heavily 
nuclear-armed countries from the U.S., Russia, France and Britain to China and North 
Korea. Although this list shows that the U.S. and Russia possess the most nuclear 
weapons of any of the world’s countries, this exhibit does not intend to single out or 
blame a specific nation. Rather it shows that Pacifism must be fought for to encourage 
countries throughout the world, both allies and adversaries to retire their nuclear weapons.  
 The museum’s sub-narrative for claiming the irrationality decision to use nuclear 
weapons is greatly supported by a permanent exhibition that focuses on the dropping of 
the bomb. The exhibit is a history and photographing of the events leading up to the 
dropping of the bomb on Hiroshima. The beginning of this exhibit shows the 
development and rapid industrialization of Hiroshima during the 1900s, and then 
suddenly the spontaneous decision to end Hiroshima’s growth and development as a city.   
This exhibit leaves the visitor to believe that nuclear weapons simply inflict 
unprecedented civilian casualties. This exhibit teaches the museum’s visitors that long 
before Hiroshima, many other cities in Japan had been targeted for the atomic bomb 
droppings. Hiroshima was a significant city but not among the nations very top cities in 
supporting the war effort as had been Osaka, Tokyo and Nagoya. Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki were selected as targets of the atomic bombs to unleash human destruction on 
innocent civilians. This exhibit establishes the need to embrace Japanese Pacifist values 
of anti-nuclear weapons, less millions of innocent civilians throughout the world be 
indiscriminately selected as targets of annihilation.  
  Another example of the unifying narrative embodied in Hiroshima’s Peace 
museum is its collaboration with primary and secondary schools throughout Japan. The 
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narrative of the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park, Ceremony and Museum has also been 
able to instill Japanese Pacifism into Japanese youth through its school affiliation 
programs. The Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum became a destination for school 
history field trips for many elementary, middle and high schools as well as schools 
throughout the country. The experience for young Japanese to visit the Hiroshima Peace 
Memorial Museum at a young age, helped to indoctrinate Japanese in Hiroshima’s as 
well as a new Japanese national narrative as the world’s only nuclear-bombed country. 
Schools visit the museum, see the exhibits and then meet with the atomic bomb survivors 
to hear their stories. Students listen to the stories of atomic bomb survivors, many of 
whom were the same ages as the young students visiting, when the bombed dropped on 
Hiroshima. This connection between generations creates a relevant Japanese Pacifist 
narrative for various generations of Japanese.   
 The museum’s importance as a national symbol is reflected in the percentage of 
the museum’s visitors, which are made up of school groups. According to statistics 
provided by the city of Hiroshima beginning in the year 1983, school groups have for 
almost two decades represented about a third of the museum’s visitors. In 1983, there 
were 1,351,104 visitors to the museum of which 36.9% were school groups 
(city.hiroshima.lg.jp). The school groups totaled at 498,657 students made up of 139,067 
elementary school students, 139,684 middle school students and 219, 906 high school 
students. The number of student group visitors went on an increasing trend from 498,657 
thousand students in 1983, to a peak of 568,345 students in 1987. The number of students 
hit a plateau where from 1987 until 1989, the number of student visitors hovered around 
568,000 to 566,000 visitors (city.hiroshima.lg.jp).  
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 The increase in the number of student groups as well as the increase in the total 
number of visitors to the Hiroshima Peace museum is a good indicator of the rise of the 
Japanese Pacifist narrative. According to a statistical measurement of the total number of 
visitors to the Hiroshima Peace Memorial museum from the museum’s opening in 1955 
until 2013, there is a similar trend as in the increasing trend of student statistics. First and 
foremost, the museum enjoyed strong growth from in the number of visitors from 1955 
until around 1991. In 1955 there were a total of 115, 369 visitors and five years later in 
1960 there were 411, 185 visitors. 1965 saw the number of visitors more than double to 
871, 772 visitors (www.city.hiroshima.lg.jp/www/contents/1397964653428/files/5.pdf). 
In 1970, there was a more moderate increase to 931, 508 visitors. In 1975 there were 
1,253,145 visitors and then eventually the museum’s peak annual number of visitors 
reached 1,593,280 in 1991.  
 These figures are significant since the peak in the number of visitors in 1991, 
because in 1990, the Japan’s stock market reached its  “bursting point,” (Hongo 2014: 1). 
While economics is not a major focus of this paper, it is important to briefly mention the 
era of the 1990s because it is arguably the end of Japan’s postwar recovery narrative, 
since the Japanese economy and growth of the nation slows down significantly for the 
next twenty plus years. Also, it was the postwar recovery that served as the foundation 
for the development of the Hiroshima Peace narrative and Japanese Pacifism. So 
arguably when the economy peaked so did the relevance of the postwar recovery sub-





 The rise of Japanese Pacifism is proof that the creation of a strong narrative is 
dependent upon conditions that create a unifying, dominant national narrative. The 
Constitution created the values of democracy and peace that generated the seeds for 
Japanese Pacifism. Changes to Japan’s national security, prohibiting its ability to declare 
war and its security pact with the U.S. gave Japan a role in world affairs as a Pacifist 
nation. Changes to Japan’s education system ushered in the teaching of democracy and 
antiwar values that helped to indoctrinate the Japanese people in the values of post war 
Japan. Lastly, a democratic political system prevented Japanese politicians from being 
able to revise the war clause in the new Japanese Constitution, because Japanese 
politicians were now accountable to their voters. 
 Without these generators of a Pacifist and democratic Japan, it would have been 
extremely unlikely that national peace memorials and museums would have come to 
symbolize Japan. Given these national narrative generators mentioned in the previous 
paragraph, the Hiroshima and Nagasaki Peace memorials, ceremonies, and museums 
were all able to help preserve and more thoroughly develop Japan’s Pacifist narrative. 
These museums have engaged various members of society from school groups to 
ordinary visitors to the very inheritors and teachers of the postwar narrative, the 
Hibakusha. But most importantly, the Hiroshima and Nagasaki Peace Memorials and 
museums have made the Japanese Pacifist national narrative into a universally unifying 
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 As Japan grew in its population, its economy, and it enjoyed the strong security 
umbrella of the U.S., its civil society and most importantly anti-war Japanese Pacifism 
grew as a dominant national narrative. Hiroshima and Nagasaki’s symbolic message of 
peace and rebirth have had a tremendous effect during the reconstruction era and 
booming years of Japan’s economy from the 1950s up until the 1990s. However 
beginning in the decades of the 1980s and 1990s, major changes occurred in Japanese 
politics, Japan’s national security, education and also on the economic front begun to 
shake the challenge the founding principles of Japanese Pacifism’s antiwar national 
narrative. Amidst these changes, the postwar anti-war Japanese Pacifist narrative has 
started to decline in influence as Japan’s unifying national narrative.  
 The national security that Japan enjoyed during several decades of its post war 
years mid 1940s till around the 1980s has become increasingly precarious. The rise of 
China in the 1980s has led to a surge in its antagonist posture towards Japan, but also 
territorial disputes between China and South Korea too. This has led to political changes 
calling for the expansion of the Japan’s Self Defense Forces. As a result of the changing 
regional security landscape, Japanese Prime Ministers have made a renewed effort to 
indoctrinate the Japanese people in a more nationalistic national narrative to reflect 
Japan’s seemingly less secure national security. The focus of several Prime Minister’s 
efforts to re-indoctrinate the Japanese people has been centered on their official visits to 
the Yasukuni War Shrine in Tokyo.   
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 After the passing of Communist China’s founding father Mao Zedong in 1976, 
the U.S. along with Japan saw the potential for China to become an ally against the 
Soviet Union. Allowing this shift in policy to occur was the normalization of diplomatic 
relations between China and Japan in 1972. In 1978, a group of Japanese class A war 
criminals from World War II who were responsible for the killings of countless Korean 
and Chinese civilians were enshrined in the Japanese Yasukuni war shrine. While the 
enshrinement of these war criminals would become a seriously controversial issue 
between Japan, Korea and China, Yasukuni shrine was still not yet the target of official 
political visits. Yasukuni shrine after World War II was changed from a public to a 
privately run institution dependent upon donations rather than government funding. This 
came as a result of the separation of religion and state mentioned in Chapter III in the 
Japanese Constitution that outlined The Rights and Duties of The People. In Article 20, it 
says, “No religious organization shall receive any privileges from the State, nor exercise 
any political authority” (japan.kantei.go.jp). 
 Following World War II, Japanese Prime Ministers visited Yasukuni shrine 
privately since most of them were in some way affected by World War II or knew 
someone who died fighting in the war. However, on August 15th 1985, Prime Minister 
Yasuhiro Nakasone, who was “trying to promote a sense of national pride, ” made the 
first official visit to the shrine by any Japanese Prime Minister after World War II 
(Berger, 1993: 125). Through his official visit to the Yasukuni shrine, sought to foster a 
revival of pride in Japan’s armed forces. As Berger notes, “Prime Minister Nakasone’s 
effort in 1986 to exceed the limit on defense spending of 1 percent of GNP, which he 
linked to what he called the final resolution of postwar” (Berger, 1993: 141). Nakasone’s 
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visit to Yasukuni shrine dealt a tremendous blow to the sound continuation of the anti-
war Pacifist national narrative. He tried to incorporate a national symbol not to expand 
the influence of Pacifism over Japan’s war memorials, but rather push for the decline of 
Japanese Pacifism.  
 Despite Prime Minister Nakasone’s attempt to put an end to the postwar Peace 
narrative, the consequences for visiting Yasukuni shrine proved that Japanese Pacifism 
was declining but was more difficult to undo then he expected. After only one visit to 
Yasukuni shrine, Nakasone forfeited further efforts to strengthen the symbolic 
importance of Yasukuni shrine as a part of Japan’s national narrative in the face of 
international criticism. He announced that he would not pay any further visits to 
Yasukuni shrine after his 1985 visit. In an effort to improve relations with the Chinese 
government, Nakasone did not visit Yasukuni in the event it would deteriorate Japanese-
Chinese relations. The most notable Chinese criticism towards Nakasone’s visit seeped 
into the September 18 protests, which marked  “the anniversary of Japan’s 1931 invasion 
of Manchuria, some 1,000 students from Beijing and Qinghua Universities staged anti-
Japanese demonstrations in Tiananmen Square” (Shibuichi, 2005 207).  
 Furthermore, Shibuichi mentions that Nakasone’s Yasukuni visit also caused 
backlash by the Japanese people that “during the spring and summer of 1985, the leftist 
political parties including the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), JCP, and the Buddhist Clean 
Government Party were demanding that Nakasone abstain from visiting the shrine. 
Demonstrations were staged criticizing Nakasone’s proposed official visit” (Shibuichi, 
2005: 206).  
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 Many Japanese leaders have a personal connection to Yasukuni shrine because it 
is the symbol of the nation’s recent past, that enshrines more of the nation’s war dead 
than any other shrine. But another political complication occurred for making Yasukuni 
shrine a core part of the Japanese national narrative, like the way in which the Hiroshima 
Peace Ceremony’s Pacifist narrative is part of Japan’s national narrative. According to an 
article in the Nikkei Shimbun, Japanese Emperor Hirohito made his last visit to Yasukuni 
shrine in 1975, after enshrinement of Class A war criminals in 1978, (nytimes.com, 2014). 
Emperor Hirohito passed away in 1989 and was succeeded by his son Emperor Akihito 
who has pledged to never make a single official visit to Yasukuni shrine. The emperor’s 
refusal to visit Yasukuni shrine causes friction between the symbols of the Prime 
Minister, making it more difficult to turn Yasukuni into a unifying national symbol.  
 The Japanese emperor’s refusal to visit Yasukuni further debilitates the efforts of 
Japan’s Prime Ministers to make the shrine into a nationally unifying symbol. Especially 
since Yasukuni shrine indiscriminately enshrines the souls of Japanese soldiers, Japanese 
citizens, Koreans and Chinese alike, visiting Yasukuni shrine sends a strong patriotic 
message to Japan. The Chinese government has pressured the Japanese government to 
remove the 14 Class A war criminals from the shrine to weaken the rise of Japanese 
Nationalism. Daiki Shibuichi in his article The Yasukuni Shrine Dispute and the Politics 
of Identity in Japan: Why All the Fuss?,  mentions that Nakasone’s response was 
politically damaging to the Japanese government because “Nakasone was seen as bowing 
to foreign pressure,” (Shibuichi, 2005: 209).  
 Nakasone’s effort to bow to foreign pressure and meanwhile force Yasukuni 
shrine into Japan’s national narrative slammed his effort to put an end to the postwar era, 
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anti-war Pacifist narrative. Nakasone urged the head priest at Yasukuni to remove the 14 
Class A war crime soldiers’ enshrined souls and relocate them in another shrine location. 
Nakasone’s request was not only refused, but also the “the chief priest refused to receive 
the prime minister in the customary manner,” (Shibuichi, 208). Given that the Japanese 
Constitution in Chapter III, Article 20 upholds that “Freedom of religion is guaranteed to 
all. No religious organization shall receive any privileges from the State, nor exercise any 
political authority,” (japan.kantei.go.jp) it would have been unconstitutional for 
Nakasone to force the head priest that regulate his religious freedom by de-enshrining the 
souls of the 14 Class A war criminals. And it would also be unconstitutional to give 
Yasukuni shrine, which was made a private Shinto religious institution after World War 
II, “privileges from the State,” (japan.kantei.go.jp). 
 The decision of the head priest of Yasukuni shrine to defy the request of Prime 
Minister Nakasone, not only shows the power of Japan’s postwar constitutional values 
but the resistance of the head priest of Yasukuni shrine to make it into a defining symbol 
of Japan’s national narrative. Even though Prime Ministers can associate Yasukuni shrine 
with Japan’s national narrative by attending the shrine’s war memorials and seasonal 
festivals, Yasukuni is not an entity of the Japanese government, complicating the 
government’s use of it as an indoctrination tool. Yasukuni shrine is a private religious 
institution, makes it a more difficult to utilize as a national symbol than the Hiroshima 
Peace Memorial Park and its monuments, since they are not a religious institution.  
 Nasakone’s controversial visit to Yasukuni shrine proved the difficulty of using 
Yasukuni shrine as a national symbol. As a result, Japanese Prime Ministers stopped 
making official visits to Yasukuni shrine until 1992. The next visit by a Prime Minister 
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was in 1996 by Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro, but after receiving harsh criticism 
from China, he backed down from visiting Yasukuni shrine again (Shibuichi, 2005: 209). 
In recent years though, there have been two Japanese Prime Ministers who have made 
several notable Yasukuni shrine visits with nationalist agendas seeking to increase 
Japan’s involvement in international security affairs. The first of these Prime Ministers is 
Junichiro Koizumi who was the first Japanese Prime Minister after World War II to truly 
persevere in his efforts to foster Japanese nationalism. When Koizumi became Prime 
Minister in 2001, his “position in domestic politics was quite strong; he was enjoying 
unprecedented popularity, ” and even following his visits to Yasukuni in 2001,2002, 
2003, and 2004, his tenure in office was not threatened simply by the fact that he visited 
Yasukuni Shrine (Shibuichi, 2005, 212). This shows the weakening influence of the anti-
war Japanese Pacifist national narrative over the Japanese people. Had most of the voting 
population been staunch Pacifists, the Yasukuni shrine visits might have cost him his 
political career.  
 While Koizumi did not create a permanent tradition for Japanese Prime Ministers 
to visit Yasukuni shrine, like they attend the Hiroshima Peace Ceremony, Koizumi’s visit 
was symbolically successful to move Japan away from anti-war Pacifism closer toward 
nationalism. During Koizumi’s term in office from 2001 to 2006, Sino-Japanese relations 
grew tense when a Chinese man landed on the Japanese occupied Senkaku islands to 
claim the islands as belonging to China. This created a serious strain between the two 
countries, as China was growing as a military power alongside the rise of Chinese 
nationalism. Koizumi responded to Chinese aggression by trying to make a tougher Japan. 
Koizumi also valued the U.S. Japanese security pact and in wanting to contribute to the 
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U.S. President George Bush’s global war on terror, he made a bold move to send the SDF 
as peacekeepers to aid U.S. fighters in Iraq (Miyashita, 2007: 100).  
 This was a momentous break from Japan’s postwar past of staying out of overseas 
wars and a huge step of progress for the Japanese Self Defense Forces, who for the first 
time participated with the U.S. in a U.S. involved war. Additionally, Akitoshi Miyashita 
points out in his article Where do norms come from? Foundations of Japan’s postwar 
pacifism, “In a poll conducted in April 2003 by Yomiuri Shimbun, the most circulated 
daily in Japan, 67 percent of the respondents said Japan should play a more active role in 
the area of international security and 54 percent of the respondents were in favor of 
revising the so-called peace constitution” (Miyashita, 2007: 100). While Prime Minister 
Koizumi was not able to bring about the fall of anti-war Japanese Pacifism by abolishing 
article 9, which denies Japan the right to declare war, he undoubtedly helped contribute to 
the decline of Japanese Pacifism.  
  The second prime minister who has made great lengths to try and end Japan’s 
anti-war Pacifism and revive Japanese nationalism through his Yasukuni shrine visits is 
the current Prime minister in 2015, Shinzo Abe. Abe although served a brief term in 
office as Prime Minister from 2005-2006, his efforts to further the development of a 
nationalist national narrative was halted since he had to step down due to poor health.  
However, Abe ran for office again in 2012, on a campaign platform “Japan is back,” in 
which Abe committed himself to rebuilding a dynamic Japanese economy and expanding 
Japan’s involvement in contributing to the U.S. led international security (Foreign 
Affairs).  
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 Whether Abe’s vision to “bring back Japan,” will come true will depend on his 
ability to use international crises to gather support to bolster Japan’s defenses. Unlike, 
Koizumi’s attempt to re-indoctrinate the Japanese people through a more direct form of 
nationalism, Abe uses the brand of the Pacifist national narrative in his “Proactive 
Pacifism,” to further a nationalist political agenda (Hoffman, 2015: 1). This re-
indoctrination has to occur through a consistent usage of national ceremonies and 
symbols and historical revisionist education. The first of the two ingredients has been 
occurring very much in favor of Abe’s vision to recreate a more nationalistic Japanese 
national narrative. During his most recent tenure from December 2012, the Senkaku 
islands dispute has grown considerably (Richards, 2014: 1). Chinese fighter jets have 
passed through Japanese airspace, and a Japanese sailor landed on and planted a Japanese 
flag on the Senkaku islands. This conflict is still ongoing in 2015, and no clear end is in 
sight. 
 Most recently, two Japanese were captured by the Islamic state in Syria at which 
Islamic State demanded 200 million dollars in ransom for the two Japanese hostages 
(Reynolds, 2015: 1). In response to the recent Japanese hostage crisis, Abe steadfastly 
responded by not giving into submitting into the demands of the terrorist organization. 
ISIS (Islamic State), demanded ransom from Japan in response to Japan’s aid package of 
Middle Eastern Countries affected by ISIS and housing refugees that fled ISIS. Abe 
neither paid the ransom nor withdrew his financial support to Middle Eastern countries. 
Abe has remained committed to recreate Japan’s image as a country that plays a proactive 
role in international affairs, and does not back down in the face of danger. This event, 
which occurred in January 2015, could prove a tremendous opportunity for the Abe 
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administration, in seeking to expand the role of Japan’s Self Defense Force to Collective 
Self Defense. Abe’s response was a major departure from Japan’s habit of crisis aversion, 
since the Japanese government in “September 1977, (a) Japan Airlines plane (was) 
hijacked and forced to land in Dhaka, Bangladesh. (After which the) Japanese 
government releases six members (of a Japanese terrorist group called the Red Army) 
and pays $6m ransom” (McCurry, 2008: 1). However, Abe “stood by his country’s 
commitment not to pay ransoms” (Reynolds, 2015: 1). 
 While Abe has handled international crises with a steadfast commitment to 
affirming a strong posture for Japan, he has not remain as steadfastly committed on 
maintaining an unbroken tradition of visiting Yasukuni shrine. After Abe became Prime 
Minister again in 2012, he visited Yasukuni shrine to cement his political policy to 
embrace Yasukuni’s symbol as playing an important role for the future of Japan’s 
national narrative. Abe’s visit to Yasukuni shrine in 2013 was significant because Abe 
came to power amidst a struggling economy and a weakening national morale after the 
Fukushima Daichi incident nuclear power plant explosion and after Japan’s Tohoku 
Tsunami, CNN notes “The confirmed death toll is 15,890 as of February 10, 2015,” 
(CNN Library, 2015: 1). The weakening of the nation’s morale after this devastating 
tsunami, earthquake and nuclear explosion, made it even more crucial for the Japanese 
political leadership to revive national morale.  
 Abe visited Yasukuni shrine in 2013, to foster a renewed sense of patriotism in 
the Japanese people at in which he sought to have those enshrined in Yasukuni serve as 
symbols of national heroes who helped build the nation. In his speech during his 2013 to 
Yasukuni shrine Abe stresses several main points: national sacrifice, the origins of 
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Japan’s Pacifism, Japan’s pledge to uphold its Pacifist values and the sensitivity of the 
Yasukuni shrine visit for Korea and China. Abe begins his speech saying that, “Today, I 
paid a visit to Yasukuni Shrine and expressed my sincere condolences, paid my respects 
and prayed for the souls of all those who had fought for the country and made ultimate 
sacrifices” (japan.kantei.go.jp). In the second part of his speech, Abe seeks to incorporate 
Japan’s war past into the Pacifist part of its postwar narrative, stressing, “The peace and 
prosperity Japan enjoys today is not created only by those who are living today.  The 
peace and prosperity we enjoy today is built on the precious sacrifices of numerous 
people who perished on the field” (japan.kantei.go.jp). Abe pledges his commitment that 
“Japan must never wage a war again.  This is my conviction based on the severe remorse 
for the past.  I have renewed my determination before the souls of the war dead to firmly 
uphold the pledge never to wage a war again” (japan.kantei.go.jp).  
 Lastly Abe explains that his intention to not make his visit a diplomatic challenge 
to Korea and China, saying that “Regrettably, it is a reality that the visit to Yasukuni 
Shrine has become a political and diplomatic issue.  Some people criticize the visit to 
Yasukuni as paying homage to war criminals, but the purpose of my visit today, on the 
anniversary of my administration’s taking office, is to report before the souls of the war 
dead how my administration has worked for one year and to renew the pledge that Japan 
must never wage a war again.  It is not my intention at all to hurt the feelings of the 
Chinese and Korean people. “ (japan.kantei.go.jp). Abe’s reason for visiting Yasukuni 
shrine is by no means an anti-Korean or anti-Chinese political move, but a move to 
reignite the Japanese people’s faith and sense of duty to their country. 
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  However, because Yasukuni is taught as a symbol of brutal colonialism as a part 
of the Korean and Chinese national narratives, Abe’s political rhetoric has not solved 
such deep-rooted anti-Japanese feeling in Korea and China. As a result of Abe’s visit to 
Yasukuni shrine, and the rise of nationalism in Japan, anti-Abe demonstrations have 
occurred in South Korea. According to the South China Morning Post, in March 2014, 
“Anti-Japan protesters assaulted a South Korean employee of the Japanese consulate in 
Busan in front of the embassy” (2014: 1). On April 1st 2015 over two years after Abe’s 
last visit to Yasukuni shrine, South Koreans held an anti-Abe demonstration outside the 
Japanese embassy in Seoul, in which, “South Korean protestors cut an effigy of Japan's 
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe” (gettyImages.com). These protests are a sign that Japan is 
not being viewed as very Pacifist by Korea, and that Japanese nationalism is on the rise 
(Hayashi, 2014: 1). 
  Korea’s growing anti-Japanese sentiment is a serious roadblock to the 
continuation of Japanese Pacifism, because such a major ingredient to the successful rise 
of Japanese Pacifism was its ability to act as a universally unifying narrative. Though 
Korea can contribute to undermining Japanese Pacifism abroad, Korea and Japan are U.S. 
allies, seeking to strengthen trilateral defenses, making it difficult for relations between 
Korea and Japan able to bring about an end to Japanese Pacifism (Pollmann, 2015: 1). 
But if Japanese-Chinese relations are to worsen, there is the very possibility that Japan 
could be brought into war, since China is “an adversary to Japan” (Roy, 2013: Ch.5). 
Therefore, anti-Japanese protests in China are most concerning for Japan. The largest 
anti-Japanese protests occurred in 2012 after Japan’s purchasing of the Senkaku islands,  
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In an article featured in The Seattle Times by Didi Tang, she mentions that “Japan’s 
Kyodo News agency said more than 60,000 people protested in at least 28 Chinese cities, 
making the anti-Japanese demonstrations the largest since the two countries normalized 
diplomatic relations in 1972” (Tang: 2012, 1). These anti-Japanese protests serve as a 
warning to the possibility of even more anti-Japanese sentiment emerging if Abe 
continues to visit Yasukuni shrine. 
 Although Abe visited Yasukuni shrine after taking office in 2012, his effort to use 
Yasukuni as a symbol of his platform of “proactive pacifism,” was halted when he 
announced in late 2014 that he would not visit Yasukuni shrine. Abe cancelled his visit to 
Yasukuni in light of his official visit to China for the 2014 Asia Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) conference in Beijing (Einhorn, 2014: 1). This was a historic visit 
for Abe, who was the first Japanese Prime Minister in years to make an official visit to 
China. Press coverage of Abe’s visit to China suggested that Abe is working to better 
cooperate politically with China and that this could lead to a major improvement in Sino-
Japanese relations. However a scene of Abe greeting Chinese Premier Xi Jinping, 
demonstrated the clash of national narratives between the Japanese Prime Minister and 
the Chinese Premier. Abe went up to the Chinese Premier, smiled, said words of gratitude 
and shook his hand, while Xi Jinping did not respond to the Prime Minister and frowned 
at Abe and the photographer (Groll, 2014: 1). This event sent a political message to Japan 
that a rising China would do whatever it could to show its antagonism towards the 
Japanese national narrative.  
 Although international criticism of Abe from China and Korea remains strong, the 
Japanese public is pretty evenly split on approving Abe’s shrine visits. According to a 
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poll in the Asahi Shimbun in 2014, Japan’s largest left-leaning newspaper, there was a 
close split in opinions on whether Abe should visit Yasukuni shrine. 46% of those 
surveyed said they felt that Abe should not have visited Yasukuni shrine. 41% of those 
surveyed said that it was right for him to have visited Yasukuni shrine and the remaining 
13% did not answer. In addition in 2006, 49% of those surveyed regarding Koizumi’s 
visit to Yasukuni shrine were in favor of his visit, while 37% opposed his visit (Asahi 
Shimbun, 2014). Even though Yasukuni is still a polarizing symbol, the fact that half of 
those surveyed supported these prime ministers visits, shows a growing irrelevance in the 
anti-war Japanese Pacifism to indoctrinate the Japanese people. 
 Although Yasukuni shrine presents a challenging narrative to Japanese Pacifism, 
its existence as a private institution and the absence of a permanent tradition of prime 
ministers to make annual visits makes it difficult to fully utilize Yasukuni to develop a 
narrative that undermines anti-war Japanese Pacifism. Even its war museum, the 
Yushukan though, which seeks to honor Japan’s soldiers during World War II, cannot 
become a direct part of Japan’s national narrative. The Yushukan was closed following 
the end of World War II by the U.S. since it not only supported Japan’s World War II 
militarism narrative opposed to U.S. democracy. Even though the Yushukan fully 
reopened in 1986 after it was renovated, still “The Yushukan War Museum has not 
regained its wartime popularity even to this day,” (Yoshida, 2007:2). 
 When the Yushukan museum reopened, its narrative was revised as to not directly 
promote the wishes of Japan’s nationalist politicians and nor were its exhibits revised 
through a Japanese Pacifist narrative. Since the Yushukan message to honor the sacrifices 
of those that died fighting for Japan, it is not publicly a part of a national narrative. If 
Soll	  48	  
though a Japanese Prime Minister were to start a permanent tradition of visits to 
Yasukuni shrine, then possibly the Yushukan would start to gain more national attention. 
Or with the rise of historical revisionism in Japanese history textbooks, as Lisa 
Yoneyama calls “Japan’s historical amnesia” of its world war II history, and an effort to 
“rewrite textbooks so as to euphemize the history of Japanese expansionism,” the the 
Yushukan could serve as a rich educational experience to teach a more nationalist 
curriculum (Yoneyama, 1999: 5). A great example of this is when a school in Takarazu 
city in Osaka prefecture caught national attention when it took a school field trip to visit 
the Yushukan. This shows that there is interest in making the Yushukan an important site 
of Japanese education. In response to this field trip, the ministry of education declared 
that there was “no problem,” with this school field trip, since it was an educational field 
trip (sankei.com, 2013). The decisions of educators to send their students on field trips to 
the Yushukan will come though from grassroots activism. The ministry of education 
cannot force schools to visit the Yushukan, but if Japanese society is further indoctrinated 
in nationalism, then there is a good chance that the school in Takarazu will be the first of 
many school field trips to the Yushukan. (sankei.com, 2013). 
 Although the Yushukan teaches an independent nationalist narrative that sparks 
controversy, it is a far less provocative symbol towards South Korea and China than 
Yasukuni shrine. Another consequence for Japanese Prime Ministers visiting Yasukuni 
shrine is that it causes China and Korea to blame Japan for additional developments, 
notably Japan’s historical revisionist, nationalist education. The example that is the target 
of such fierce anti-Japanese sentiment are the glossing over in Japanese textbooks of The 
Rape of Nanjing in 1937, China, and the sexual enslavement of Korean women 
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(Williamson, 2013: 1). Since China brings up the fact that the Rape of Nanjing, the 
slaughtering of thousands of innocent Chinese civilians, this causes an additional barrier 
to symbolizing the Yasukuni shrine visit into part of a unifying Japanese narrative. 
Another challenge to the use of Yasukuni shrine as a part of “proactive pacifism,” is the 
fact that in 2014, Prime Minister Xi Jinping hosted the first annual ceremony to 
commemorate the lives lost then (telegraph.co.uk, 2014). Yasukuni shrine, while 
originally evocative because it enshrined the 14 Class A, War Criminals, has transformed 
into a Pandora’s box to cause friction between the Japanese, Chinese, South and North 

















 Japanese Pacifism is becoming less important for Japan’s national narrative 
because it weakly addresses Japan’s current international security environment, the state 
of the economy and does little to strongly boost national morale. For this reason, many of 
Japan’s most important politicians over the past 30 years have turned their eyes away 
Pacifism in search of a new Japanese national narrative. Yasukuni shrine although 
appears to be a useful symbol to create a renewed sense of patriotism in the Japanese 
nation, there are countless barriers to allowing it to become a permanent symbol of 
Japan’s changing national narrative. It enshrines millions of souls from a century of 
Japanese wars, and is the best national symbol to send a message to honor the souls that 
fell fighting for the Japanese nation. However, once Emperor Hirohito refused to visit 
again after the enshrining of the 14 Class A war criminals, Yasukuni became a divisive 
symbol for the nation. 
 Given the political, economic and educational shifts that are pushing Japan to 
recreate its national narrative, Prime Ministers continue to try and make Yasukuni part of 
the national narrative. If another international crisis, that greatly threatens Japanese 
security were to occur, or if Japanese Chinese relations permanently sour then Yasukuni 
and the Yushukan museum might become unifying symbols that re-indoctrinate the 
Japanese people in a growing nationalism. However, since Japanese-Chinese relations are 
rocky but both these countries are strong trading partners and there has been no fighting 
between the two countries, Yasukuni is not fully accessible as an indoctrination symbol. 
The biggest challenge for Abe using his slogan of “proactive Pacifism,” to normalize 
Japan and allow it to take a more active role in international security, will be for him to 
Soll	  51	  
find permanent indoctrination tools to hand down to the next generation of Japanese 
leaders.  
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 The Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park and Museum have been very successful in 
preserving Japanese Pacifism by staying relevant to Japan’s postwar narrative to revive 
national spirit and encourage popular efforts to rebuild the Japanese nation. Yet, this 
Hiroshima narrative of Japanese Pacifism faces tremendous challenges related to 
addressing the future of Japan’s national narrative, which is moving towards nationalism. 
If the Hiroshima Peace museum is to maintain relevance in the emerging nationalism in 
Japan, the museum, ceremony and Peace Park must help to contribute to the development 
of a unifying national narrative.  
 This chapter will look at two successful national indoctrination campaigns using 
national memorials and museums to reflect on the role of the Hiroshima museum’s 
Japanese Pacifist narrative for the future of Japan. The first example is Germany’s use of 
the Dresden Museum of Military History as a national indoctrination tool from World 
War II through the Cold War until the present. Each time the German national narrative 
has changed, so has the narrative of the Dresden Museum of Military History. If the 
Dresden Military museum’s narrative’s had not been revised to address the unifying 
national narrative at the time, it could have easily become less relevant as a social 
indoctrination tool.  
 The changing narrative of the Dresden Museum of Military History to embrace 
the changing national narrative is a unique characteristic of the museum. Whereas the 
Hiroshima Peace Museum has only been a part of a single Japanese national narrative, 
the Dresden Museum of Military History has contributed to different national narratives, 
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given the historical era. This is given that “Since its 1897 founding, the Dresden Museum 
of Military History has been a Saxon armory and museum, a Nazi museum, a Soviet 
museum and an East German museum.” (archdaily, 2011). And currently the Dresden 
Museum of Military History is a German museum, ever since the fall of Communist East 
Germany when the Berlin Wall collapsed in 1989, and the reunification of Germany in 
1990 (Münkler, 2012).  
 After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the Dresden museum was closed for 
eleven years, to revise the museum’s narrative and make the museum relevant audiences 
after the unification of Germany in 1990. The Dresden museum reopened after its most 
recent renovation completed in 2011, designed by architect Daniel Libeskind. The 
renovation of this museum is also significant being “the first war museum to open in 
Germany since the country's reunification and a study in contrasts appropriate to a nation 
grappling with its violent past” (Weiner, 2011). The most important feature added to the 
museum was a massive steel wedge coming out of the museum, designed by Liebskind  
“symbolizing Germany's ugly and complex military history” (Alessi, 2013: 1). 
 After the Dresden museum’s reopening in 2011, the museum has become a key 
symbol for the German military. “In recent years, the Dresden museum has become 
increasingly relevant for many German officers, who are now required to visit as part of 
their training,” (Alessi, 2013: 1). The reintroduction of the Dresden museum into German 
society gave it a major contributing role in the preservation of the country’s national 
narrative. The Dresden museum is an example for the Hiroshima Peace Memorial 
Museum to follow because the Dresden museum first stays relevant to its own local 
narrative, by which the museum’s architect Daniel Libeskind mentions; “The destruction 
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of Europe and European cities by the Nazis is part of the story of the destruction of 
Dresden” (archdaily, 2011). Second, the Dresden museum addresses Germany’s national 
narrative with, especially with its Afghanistan exhibit, seeks to create a discussion with 
the museum’s visitors of what would result from an expansion of German security 
presence in the world (Alessi, 2013: 1). 
 The Dresden military museum is a great example of how a museum can stay 
relevant to helping develop and maintain the future course of a country’s national 
narrative. The Dresden Military Museum has been changed several times to embody the 
national values of each national narrative. The Dresden military museum continued to not 
only embraces each national narrative that developed in Germany, but it continued as one 
of the nation’s predominant symbols. Germany did not need to build a separate museum 
each time a national narrative developed, but rather its leaders historically revised the 
national narrative conveyed in its museums to stay up to date in representing the latest, 
unifying national narrative.  
 Japanese leaders, particularly those in charge of shaping the Japanese Pacifist 
narrative at Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum can learn a lot from the way in which 
the Dresden Museum of Military History has contributed to the country’s evolving 
national narratives. The Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum has only been around 
during the existence of a single national narrative, Japanese Pacifism. Since Japanese 
Pacifism is declining but is yet to fall as a national narrative, the Hiroshima museum’s 
narrative can continue to embody a stable but rather stagnant following. While the 
museum still enjoys a good following, according to statistical data mentioned earlier in 
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the paper, the Hiroshima museum could be at great risk in the event of an end to Japanese 
anti-war Pacifism.  
 If the Hiroshima Peace Memorial museum does not seek to address issues more 
relevant to the current Japanese people, such as territorial conflict between Japan, China 
and Korea or the expansion of the Self-Defense Forces, the Hiroshima museum could 
decline in popularity. If the narrative of peace taught in the Hiroshima museum is to 
address these current issues that are dividing the nation, then it would create an even 
bigger space to discuss the importance of Japanese Pacifism. If the museum continues to 
focus on issues that have been unchanged since the museum’s founding, such as 
abolishing nuclear weapons, then the Hiroshima Peace narrative will continue to stay 
stuck in the past.  
 The Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum, since its establishment in 1955, has 
remained an important of Japan’s national narrative. However, there is the possibility that 
if it does not discuss the rise of Japanese nationalism, then it could end up less relevant in 
the future, the same way the Yushukan or Yasukuni shrine were after World War II. The 
Japanese governments from the Meiji government during the late 19th century until the 
end of WWII in 1945 ensured that Yasukuni shrine would remain a relevant part of 
Japan’s national narrative, by enshrining all of Japan’s dead from following wars at 
Yasukuni. According to Yasukuni shrine’s website, “Currently, more than 2,466,000 
divinities are enshrined here at Yasukuni Shrine. These are souls of men who made 
ultimate sacrifice for their nation since 1853 during national crisis such as the Boshin 
War, the Seinan War, the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars, World War I, the 
Manchurian Incident, the China Incident and the Greater East Asian War (World War II)” 
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(yasukuni.or.jp). As more families had been affected by Japan’s wars, the war memorial 
festivals at Yasukuni brought communities all throughout Tokyo and other parts of Japan 
together. A national Shinto ceremony attended by the emperor that honored family 
members and embodied national heroes greatly stimulated Japanese nationalism.  
 In order to ensure an even more powerful national indoctrination experience, the 
Meiji government established the Yushukan museum. The Yushukan acts as a tool of 
national storytelling of Japan’s wars and national achievements, which helps connect the 
Japanese people to become supportive of and understand the contributions that those 
enshrined at Yasukuni made to the nation. Inside the Yushukan are the uniforms and 
weapons of the soldiers from all of Japan’s wars until World War II (Yoshida, 2007:3). 
This helps to create a sense of pride for the Japanese people who see their powerful 
military and triumphant victories. The national history conveyed by the Yushukan shows 
how Japan eliminated its backwardness by embracing modern weaponry and military 
tactics to become one of the world’s most powerful nations.   
 During World War II, Japan began to grow into one of the world’s greatest 
empires, and so the museum featured World War II exhibits. These World War II exhibits 
featured the zero fighter planes, which became a symbol of the nation’s powerful 
industrialization and military prowess (Yoshida, 2007: 3). Visitors to the Yushukan 
would see an unchallenged narrative that glorified the nation’s war heroes. The Yushukan 
served to represent a history of Japan during World War II, which became a narrative of 
using Japan’s military and industrial might to develop East Asian countries. In order to 
legitimize its nationalism, the Yushukan taught a narrative of Japan invading Asian 
countries in order to protect them from Western countries seeking to colonize Asian 
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countries. The Yushukan remained a valuable tool to State Shinto indoctrination because 
its exhibits taught Japan’s uncontested, dominant national narrative. 
 When the role of the Japanese military began to expand in its colonial activities in 
China in the 1930s and leading up to the outbreak of World War II, the Yushukan’s 
narrative was extremely popular to the Japanese public. The peak annual number of 
visitors to the Yushukan surpassed the maximum number of visitors that the Hiroshima 
Peace Memorial Museum has enjoyed at its peak in 1991 at around 1,500,000 visitors 
(city.hiroshima.lg.jp). “Following Japan’s 1931 invasion of Manchuria, received more 
than a half million visitors annually. The popularity of the museum further increased after 
the war against China commenced in 1937. In 1938, more than 1.4 million people, 
including approximately 225,000 students, visited the museum complex, whereas in 1940 
the museum welcomed nearly 1.9 million visitors, including 161,000 students.” (Yoshida, 
2007: 2). However, after the end of World War II, the number of visitors to the Yushukan 
has severely declined, reaching not even 300,000 visitors in the year 2002-2003 (Yoshida, 
2007: 3). 
 Yasukuni and the Yushukan were pre WWII Japan’s most important national 
symbols. Yasukuni acted as the centerpiece of Japan’s State Shinto national narrative, 
and helped foster one of Japan’s most successful and strongest national narratives. 
Yasukuni and the Yushukan became an inescapable part of the Japanese’ lives, since 
these sites symbolized loyalty to the emperor, military service, engagement in public 
Shinto rituals, and memorializing the war dead. Japan’s State Shinto national narrative 
was contagiously powerful because it penetrated through all aspects of Japanese life 
without symbols teaching an opposing narrative. The nationalism of State Shinto was 
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hardly threatened from within or from abroad, since the Japanese military had defeated its 
neighbors and the police quelled any and all internal political dissent.  
 These two great examples of how memorials and museums help contribute to the 
development of a national narrative are most relevant for the future of Japanese Pacifism. 
The attendance at the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum has continued to embrace a 
regional, Japan’s postwar recovery Hiroshima narrative of anti-war Pacifism. However, 
while  “proactive pacifism,” and nationalism have begun to appeal to the Japanese people, 
the Hiroshima Peace Museum continues to develop the same narrative, without 
addressing the changes in Japan, whether national security, social, economic, etc. Yuan 
Cai whose article, “The Rise and Decline of Japanese Pacifism” has greatly influenced 
the direction of this thesis in which she says about the Japanese people that, “a war-weary 
and destitute population eagerly embraced pacifism out of desperation” (Cai, 2007: 181).  
 However given that most Japanese today have never experienced war, anti-war 
Japanese Pacifism is irrelevant to many generations of the Japanese people. Cai claims 
that the “The generational change in Japan slowly eroded the foundation of Pacifism” and 
“Post-war economic prosperity largely rendered the tales of hardship and suffering 
incomprehensible to a youth who had only known affluence”(Cai, 2007: 197). Not only 
are there increasingly fewer Japanese who have experienced war, in the near future there 
will be no more World War II or Atomic Bomb survivors left to communicate the horrors 
of war to future generations. The passing of these remaining survivors will thus represent 
an even bigger departure from Japan’s anti-war Pacifism past.  
 As a result of the decline of Japanese Pacifism as a unifying national narrative, 
the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum has struggled to grow the anti-war Pacifist 
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narrative. The most important role and significant impact of a museum are to develop or 
preserve an already existing narrative. The Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum was so 
successful at indoctrinating the Japanese people in anti-war Japanese Pacifism largely 
because the Japanese people saw that by embracing a Japanese anti-war Pacifism 
narrative, they could rebuild their country. The Hiroshima Peace Museum helped 
contribute to the growth of an already growing narrative. However, given that the current 
Japanese national narrative is more nationalistic, the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum 
can continue to develop a Hiroshima, transnational peace narrative. Or, it could revise its 
museum narrative to develop the emerging proactive pacifist narrative. 
 A sign of the declining relevance of Japan’s anti-war Pacifist narrative is reflected 
in the decline in museum visitors to the museum over the years. After the museum 
reached its peak turnout of 1,593,280 visitors in 1991, the number of annual visitors has 
begun to decline (city.hiroshima.lg.jp). In 2000, there were 1,075,111 visitors. The 
following ten years has seen an increase in the number of visitors to 1,329,842 visitors in 
2010, and 1,383,129 visitors in 2013. However, something important to note is the 
increase in foreign tourists as a percentage of the overall number of visitors after 2000. In 
2000 there were 1,075,111 visitors and of those visitors 93,045 of them were foreigners. 
In 2013, the number of foreigners more than doubled, since 200,086 visitors of the 
1,329,842 total visitors were foreigners (city.hiroshima.lg.jp). While Hiroshima’s 
narrative is struggling to appeal to more Japanese, it is becoming increasingly appealing 
to foreign audiences. 
 Another sign that Japanese Pacifism is declining amongst future generations can 
be seen in the decrease in the number of students from school field trips visiting the 
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museum. The number of student group visitors peaked in 1987 at 568,345 students out of 
the total number of visitors but then shortly after began a steady decline. In 1992, there 
were 468,637 students that visited the museum. In 1997, that number fell further to 
388,736 student visitors. The number of student visitors continued to decline until 2007, 
when it was at a record low of 298,803 (city.hiroshima.lg.jp). Although the number of 
students has slowly started to increase after 2007, to 315, 500 students in 2013, but this 
figure is still far below the peak years in the late 80s of over 500,000 students. 
   This slight recovery in the number of student visitors and overall visitors is 
evident that anti-war Pacifism is still maintained in Hiroshima. Though if the museum is 
to once again become more relevant to the Japanese public and steadily increase the 
number of Japanese visitors, it will need to become more relevant to changing Japanese 
national narrative. However, no such changes have occurred in the museum’s narrative to 
address topics such as events in World War II, which are gaining more attention 
throughout Japan. The Hiroshima Peace Museum stays committed to the anti-war, anti-
nuclear weapons Japanese Pacifist narrative that emerged after World War II. This 
narrative can remain as a regional narrative and contribute to worldwide peace 
movements, however at the expense of being the dominant component of Japan’s 







 If a museum does not stay relevant to the changes in a national narrative, it will 
decline in the importance of its role in helping to develop a national narrative. The 
example of the Dresden Museum of Military History is the best example of how a 
museum can stay true to its local history, while also helping to address the current 
national narrative. Yasukuni Shrine and the Yushukan on the other hand, did well to 
embrace the national narrative of state Shinto and Japanese nationalism but after World 
War II, they have not been reinvented and neither were their museum narratives revised 
to be able to contribute to the Japanese Pacifist national narrative. Therefore, Hiroshima 
could address more relevant topics such as proactive pacifism and rising nationalism, to 















 Japanese anti-war Pacifism as a whole is on the decline in Japan. The Hiroshima 
Peace Museum still retains its number of annual visitors but has not been growing its 
number of visitors significantly in recent years amongst Japanese. Given the increase in 
the rise of China, Japan’s struggle to recover after its financial crisis in the early 1990s 
and the generational disconnect with Japanese Pacifism, Japanese Pacifism is well into its 
decline. However, given the ineffective efforts of Japanese Prime Ministers to establish a 
permanent tradition of Yasukuni shrine visits and the growing irrelevance of Hiroshima 
anti-war Pacifism to Japan’s national narrative, Japan would best benefit if it finds more 
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